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Abstract
Increased attention to the issue of aid effectiveness has sparked a flurry of em-
pirical studies attempting to measure the macro-level impact of aid flows on the
performances of developing countries. These studies yield ambiguous and even
contradictory results and one possible source of confusion is the fact that they
are not grounded in solid theorizing. This paper tries to remedy this lacuna
by proposing a principal-agent model in which the donor monitors the use of
aid and metes out sanctions in the event of fraud detection. Its most original
feature lies in the assumed comparability between internal (domestic) and ex-
ternal (donor-imposed) disciplines and the resulting possibility of studying the
behaviour of aggregate discipline. We show that, contrary to intuition, an (ex-
ogenous) improvement of domestic discipline may be over-compensated by the
donor so that total discipline actually decreases and elite capture paradoxically
increases. This implies that the relationship between domestic and total disci-
plines may be non-monotonous. We highlight the crucial role of the shape of the
cost functions to obtain not only the above paradox but also corner solutions in
which the donor optimally chooses to refrain from imposing any external disci-
pline. The central lesson to draw from the whole exercise is therefore that no
simple general testable prediction can be inferred from economic theory regard-
ing the impact of aid on the donors’ objective even when the quality of domestic
governance or the policy environment is considered.
JEL Codes: D02, D86, O12, F35
∗Paris School of Economics
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1 Introduction
Increased attention to the issue of aid effectiveness has sparked a flurry of em-
pirical studies attempting to measure the macro-level impact of aid flows on the
performances of developing countries. Following the seminal paper by Burnside
and Dollar (2000), a standard approach consists of looking at the effect of aid
on long-run growth rates controlling for quality of governance or the policy en-
vironment in recipient countries, itself interacted with aid. Their main result,
namely that aid is effective when combined with good policies while “in the
presence of poor policies, aid has no positive effect on growth” (p. 847), has
been thoroughly challenged for its lack of robustness, and the available litera-
ture is replete with ambiguous conclusions and contradictory evidence, leaving
a strong impression of disarray. Especially noticeable is the work of Rajan and
Subramanian (2007, 2008) who found that the impact of foreign aid on growth
is non-existent whatever is the estimation approach used, the type of aid or the
time period considered. They attribute this disappointing result to the detri-
mental effect of aid on governance quality, in a way reminiscent of Easterly
(2007) who drew attention to the critical role of incentives and the policy en-
vironment. In contrast, Arndt, Jones and Tarp (2010) have argued that, by
applying a different econometric methodology to the data, a different conclu-
sion can be reached, namely that aid has a positive and significant causal effect
on growth over the long run. Other studies actually add fuel to this unsettled
controversy (see, e.g., Dalgaard et al., 2004; Roodman, 2007; Djankov et al.,
2008; Doucouliagos. and Paldam, 2009; Juselius et al., 2013), or show that un-
certainty of aid impact also obtains when performance is measured by poverty
reduction or inequality rather than economic growth (Masud and Yontcheva,
2005; Chong et al., 2009).
A central problem with this voluminous literature is that the main hypothesis
put to the test is grounded in an intuitive argument whose logic appears quite
straightforward. In this paper, we nevertheless argue that, as soon as we assume
that domestic governance can be influenced by the donors, this simple logic can
be deceptive. Since the idea of endogenous governance makes sense in the light
of past and recent experiences in development aid strategies, solid theorizing is
thus absolutely required to design valid and interpretable empirical tests.
Our analytical endeavor starts from the premise that donors resort to mon-
itoring and sanctioning mechanisms in order to improve preference alignment,
particularly with respect to poverty reduction. It is true that, in the scant the-
oretical literature devoted to the problem of aid effectiveness, several attempts
feature a donor able to impose punishment on non-compliant recipient govern-
ments, typically through a conditionality mechanism (Azam and Laffont, 2003;
Svensson, 2000, 2003; Gaspart and Platteau, 2012; Chauvet et al., 2012). The
originality of our paper lies in the fact that the discipline brought to bear by
the donor is made analytically comparable to the domestic discipline to which
the target population subjects its own elite or government. In other words, gov-
ernance of aid-funded programs can be conceived as the outcome of two types
of discipline, internal and external, which can be somehow aggregated. As a
2
consequence, we are in a position to explore a new set of issues, such as whether
internal and external disciplines are substitutes or complements, and whether
an increase in internal discipline has the effect of also raising the level of total
discipline and, therefore, the quality of governance.
Rather unexpectedly, there is no easy answer to the second question. Even
though external and internal disciplines are substitutes, the donor may be in-
duced to over-compensate a change in internal discipline in the recipient country.
In particular, an increase in internal discipline may lead, paradoxically, to a fall
in total discipline with the effect that the quality of governance, measured as
the inverse of elite capture, actually decreases. Whether this happens or not
depends not only on the initial level of internal governance, but also on the
shapes of the cost functions and on the efficacy of monitoring by the donor. It
also critically depends on whether the participation constraint of the local elite
or government is binding or not. When it is binding, total discipline remains
constant. Finally, a detailed analysis of the role of the cost functions shows
how some particular shapes may lead to degenerate solutions in which external
discipline is set to zero.
The implication of our analysis for empirical testing is therefore rather
counter-intuitive : when aid effectiveness is measured by the proportion of aid
that effectively reaches the targeted beneficiaries (or the inverse of local elite
capture), countries with better initial levels of governance quality may well be
less aid-effective than other recipient countries because the donor may choose to
respond to better domestic governance by relaxing his own external discipline
in a disproportionate way. If the required conditions are satisfied, we should
not expect to find in the data the sort of positive relationship between aid,
governance and performance that is typically presumed in the vast empirical
literature devoted to the subject.
There are also practical policy implications, in particular the desirability
to innovate in matters of supervision and punishment technologies so as to
avoid situations in which the donor chooses to optimally abstain from exerting
external discipline or to over-compensate improvements in local governance in
the manner just described.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide a snapshot of the
history of successive approaches to development aid in the world donor com-
munity. This is with a view to showing the renewed importance of the aid
effectiveness debate as well as the salience of the idea of external discipline. In
Section 3, we then move to precise the setup of the model and place it in the
context of the existing literature. In Section 4, its building blocks are presented,
starting with the problem of the local government or elite (called the leader),
and ending with the donor’s problem after discussing the monitoring function.
In Section 5, we analyze the general case that obtains when the participation
constraint of the leader is not binding, leaving to Section 6 the more particular
(and much more simple) case where this constraint is binding. In Section 7,
a series of remarks or extensions are discussed and, in particular, we explain
more carefully why our approach to modeling, focused on the interaction be-
tween internal and external disciplines, prevents us from describing the donor’s
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objective by the conventional altruistic function, such as is done in Azam and
Laffont (2003), for example. Section 8 concludes.
2 Renewed interest for external discipline
Following disillusionment with past approaches to development aid that relied
on conditionality programs and project aid, new principles have been formu-
lated in the Paris Declaration (March 2005) and the Accra Agenda for Ac-
tion (September 2008), itself followed by the Busan Partnership for Effective
Development Cooperation (December 2011). The underlying idea is that aid
effectiveness can be significantly raised through new aid modalities that empha-
size ownership (giving more policy space to recipient governments) and ’policy
dialogue’, as well as transparency and accountability, reduce the role of condi-
tionalities, and avoid reform overload. Following up on these principles, priority
has been increasingly given to so-called General Budget Support (GBS) deemed
to more effectively reduce poverty through non-earmarking of the aid funds and
enhanced recipient country ownership.
After a few years of active implementation of the new strategy, however,
donor agencies came to realize that excessive hopes had been placed in it, es-
pecially when there is a wide divergence between their objectives and those of
the recipient countries. In practice, indeed, the donors started budget support
even when entry conditions were not met and the recipient governments just
committed to or stated their intentions of improving policies, governance or
public financial management. In other words, donors used GBS to bring about
the desired changes in policies and governance instead of supporting deserv-
ing governements (Dijkstra, 2013). A major conflict thus emerged between the
objective of reducing transaction costs and engaging recipient governments by
providing freely spendable money that can be used in line their own priorities,
on the one hand, and the objective of influencing their policies and governance
in a way considered appropriate by the donor agencies, on the other hand. The
latter typically included such concerns as organizing free and fair elections, es-
tablishing the rule of the law and an independent judiciary, fighting against
corruption, enacting sound macroeconomic policies, and committing to poverty
reduction.
The reaction of many donor agencies to this predicament consisted of rein-
troducing substantial ex post conditionalities, often via the threat of witholding
further tranches of aid money in case of the recipient’s non-compliance with the
donor’s conditions. This implied that GBS can be suspended or reduced, such
as happened with Nicaragua, for example, when the European Union and bi-
lateral donors concluded that the government of prime minister Ortega did not
want to fulfill his commitment to ensure free and fair elections in the country
(Dijkstra, 2013). The World Bank, to give another example, decided to halt its
budget support to the government of Honduras and to replace it with project
funding after the International Monetary Fund did not renew a standby agree-
ment (2013). More significantly, several aid agencies known for their rigorous
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approach to aid cooperation (such as SIDA in Sweden, or DFID in the United
Kingdom) have begun to retreat from GBS programmes altogether, owing to
serious misuses of aid resources (see the evaluation reports by SADEV, 2010,
and DFID, 2011). Thus, in a review the OCDE notes that “weak systems to
align with and a high risk of corruption have influenced Swedish readiness to
provide general budget support” (OECD DAC, 2009, p. 47). In this context, it
is not surprising that in the corridors of aid agencies a “Paris Agenda fatigue”
is increasingly mentioned (Oden and Wohlgemuth, 2011). Also in line with the
above diagnosis, the European Union has re-introduced the concept of result-
based disbursements into its budget support programmes (part of the aid is
variable, being released in successive tranches conditioned on the performances
of the country),1 and the World Bank is launching a new results-based lending
instrument, the so-called Program-for-Results.
None the less, it is easy to understand why, among different aid modalities,
budget support is most difficult to fit into a donors’ imposed disciplining mech-
anism, as the aforementioned experiences of Nicaragua and Honduras attest.
GBS is bound to be linked to the fulfillment of fundamental principles that are
politically sensitive, arguable, and difficult to implement in a rather short time
(on the latter point, see Pritchett et al., 2013). At the other extreme, project
aid is probably the easiest to bring into the purview of external discipline (al-
though the resulting transaction costs are likely to be larger), and programme
aid occupies the middle ground (see Bigsten, 2013).
A detailed empirical study based on a review of 1426 World Bank projects
completed between 1981 and 1991 highlights the potential contribution of moni-
toring to effectiveness of project aid (Kilby, 1995).2 This study indeed concludes
that (i) past supervision has a positive and perceptible impact on project perfor-
mance; (ii) early supervision is much more effective than later supervision; and
(iii) the impact of supervision is relatively homogenous across regions, sectors
and macroeconomic conditions. Moreover, the benefits of supervision greatly
exceed the costs: a substantial and sustained increase in the average level of
supervision may generate a noticeable improvement in the average economic
rate of return. Using the same dataset, Chauvet et al. (2012) argue that not
only a more precise supervision of projects increases the likelihood of project
success, but the effect of higher monitoring precision is significantly more effec-
tive when interests between donor and recipient (as perceived by the donor) are
more diverging.
1Through the so-called split response mechanism, the donors link disbursements of a por-
tion of aid money to a general assessment of the principles agreed upon with the recipient
government, and the other part to the degree of performance of specific indicators specified
in the Performance Assessment Matrix (Dijkstra, 2013: 116).
2Endogeneity (supervision influences performance which in turn influences subsequent su-
pervision allocation decisions) is overcome by relating lagged annual supervision to annual
changes in interim performance.
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3 The setup of the model
In writing the model, we stick to a well-established tradition whereby the in-
centive aspects of alignment between the interests of donors and recipient gov-
ernments are analyzed within the principal-agent framework. We restrict our
attention to the one-donor-one-recipient case because the issue that we want
to address, the interaction between internal and external disciplines, is in itself
quite complex. The ultimate purpose of such an attempt is admittedly to revisit
the problem of aid allocation between several recipient countries in the presence
of an explicit tradeoff between considerations of needs and governance (the most
needy countries are not necessarily excluded from aid programmes because their
domestic governance can be improved by the donor community). However, ow-
ing to the ambitious character of the whole project, we decided to leave the
second step of the analysis to another paper (Bourguignon and Platteau, 2013).
Given the perspective that we adopt, a central question is how to represent
governance. We measure governance by an outcome variable, namely the inverse
of elite capture or the share of aid flows that reaches the ordinary citizens or the
poor. When this share is larger, governance is considered to have improved. A
disciplining mechanism is considered to be operating when not only the elite’s
utility from fraud decreases as the imposed discipline gets tighter, but also the
marginal loss of utility caused by such a tightening increases when fraud or
embezzlement is larger. The elite is disciplined internally when the local society
exerts its own control, or externally when the discipline is imposed by the donor.
Discipline is internally activated if the national community punishes fraudulent
behavior in some way or other. The punishment meted out by the local society
can be conceptualized as a ’tax’ imposed on the share unduly appropriated
by its elite. Alternatively, such a ’tax’ can be regarded as being self-imposed
in the sense that the elite may feel some guilt vis-à-vis its own people when
appropriating part of the aid flow. Whereas internal discipline is assumed to be
exogenous, external discipline is optimally chosen by the donor when it decides
the level of its monitoring activity and the amount of punishment imposed in
the event of fraud detection.
As a matter of fact, unlike the community which is assumed to perfectly
observe the fraud, the donor agency may get unequivocal evidence of it only
with a positive probability. This is, of course, a simplified framework which
we adopt only for the sake of capturing the fact that citizens - and a fortiori
the leader itself if the internal dicipline is self-imposed - are better informed
than outside agencies about the behaviour of their elite or authorities. On the
other hand, since direct punishment may prove practically difficult to enforce
for an external organization, it helps to think of sanctioning as the withdrawal
of future benefits (the leader, for example, would be put on a black list that
would prevent him from receiving aid funds any time in the future).
Finally, the probability of fraud detection depends positively on the preci-
sion of monitoring (which is costly), and on the extent of the embezzlement by
the leader. Monitoring expenditures are incurred ex ante in contrast to pun-
ishment costs, which are only incurred when fraud is actually detected. The
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recipient decides how much aid money it appropriates, knowing the level of in-
ternal discipline and the monitoring precision and punishment decided by the
donor.
Our model bears some similarities with the model of Chauvet et al. (2012)
where the donor also chooses the levels of monitoring precision and punishment
(amount of the second tranche of aid money, which is conditionally disbursed)
with the aim of disciplining the recipient. The level of internal discipline, con-
ceived as the extent of congruence of interests between the donor and the re-
cipient, is exogenously given. The recipient chooses the level of effort which
influences the probability of detection of inappropriate behaviour by the donor.
Likewise, in Gaspart and Platteau (2013), the donor again chooses the amount
of monitoring (expenditures) and the level of punishment (also measured by the
amount of a second tranche). Yet, in their model, internal disciplining of the
local elite is achieved by the exit options of a bargaining game between this
elite and the grassroots. The donor chooses the level of embezzlement which
influences the probability of detection.
In neither of these two aforementioned models, however, can we directly
compare internal and external disciplines. As a consequence, effects on total
discipline, conceived as the sum of the internal and external components, cannot
be studied. The same holds true of Svensson (2000), where the recipient country
is disciplined because the aid contract specifies the amount of aid disbursed as a
function of observed performances that counfound the effects of a shock and of
internal reform effort. It is also true for Azam and Laffont (2003) who look for
the optimal aid contract. According to this contract, the recipient government
will receive an aid amount (which is endogenous) linearly dependent on the level
of consumption of the poor that it provides. Such a rule is considered by the
authors as describing the conditionality mechanism in a stylized manner.
Before turning to the task of presenting the building blocks of our model
in formal terms, it is worth noticing that, because the setup of our theory
involves monitoring and punishment mechanisms, it has links both to general
contract theory and to the law and economics literature. Regarding the latter,
we have more specifically in mind the strand of literature dealing with crime
and punishment (see, e.g., Garoupa, 1997), whereas for the former we think of
(i) contracts in which a minimum level of performance is set by the principal,
and contract is not renewed if violation of this condition is detected. (see, e.g.,
Otsuka, Chuma, and Hayami, 1993; Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005)3, and of
(ii) contracts in which a bonus is offered to the agent if performance (e.g., the
quality of a good sold) has been verified to be of acceptable quality and a penalty
is imposed if it is not (MacLeod, 2007). In the case of contracts of type (ii),
penalties may consist of loss of reputation, loss of future access to the market,
harassment, threats and court action (Fafchamps, 2004). As is evident from the
above description, our setup implies a contract (ii) but of the asymmetric kind
(no bonus is provided).
3Violation is detected with a positive probability that depends positively on the degree of
shirking and resources devoted to supervision
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4 The building blocks
Our model is deliberately parsimonious because the issue that we tackle is com-
plex, and we need to achieve interpretable results that can be relevant for donor
agencies and policy-makers. In this section, we successively describe the ob-
jective function of the leader or the elite, the probability function for fraud
detection, the leader’s optimal behavior given the aid delivery parameters cho-
sen by the donor, and the latter’s maximization problem yielding the optimal
values of these parameters. Note that a complete list of the notations used is
presented in Appendix A.
4.1 Objective of the leader
For each unit of aid, the leader’s problem is written:
Max
y
V (y) = y − γpi(by)− βy2 − g (1)
Bearing in mind that y is the share of aid appropriated by the leader or the
elite of the recipient country (that is, the extent of ’fraud’), so that y ∈ [0, 1],
the first two terms show the expected gain by the leader, assuming he/she will
have to pay the whole penalty, γ, which the donor inflicts if a fraud is detected.
The probability function, pi(y), is the probability of the fraud being detected at
the monitoring precision, b = 1. By increasing the monitoring precision, b, the
donor may therefore increase the probability of fraud detection, pi(by), for any
given y. The third term in the above expression is the cost of the fraud for the
leader, with β representing the intrinsic, or domestic governance parameter of
the recipient country (β ∈ [0, 1]). As we have pointed out earlier, the cost of
fraud may be conceived as the cost imposed by the national community or as
a self-inflicted cost, such as when the leader makes voluntary gifts to clients to
buy their accumplicity. In keeping with our understanding of the disciplining
mechanism, the relationship between this cost and the extent of the fraud, y, is
assumed to be increasing and convex. In this way, we ensure that not only the
leader’s utility, V , decreases as β is raised, but also that the marginal loss of
utility caused by an increase in β is greater when the fraud is more important,
that is Vyβ = δ
2V
δβ.δy ≤ 0. As will become clear when the probability of fraud
detection is specified, the same property applies to externally imposed discipline:
in this case, it is the marginal loss of leader’s utility caused by an increase in
either b or γ that grows when the leader appropriates a larger share of the aid
transfer.
The last component of the leader’s utility function, g, is the cost of handling
one unit of aid, which is assumed to be constant (it is, therefore, independent
of the amount of the fraud). Such a cost includes all the expenses or effort that
the leader must incur in order to get hold of the aid amount by applying to
the donor agency, organizing meetings with the intended beneficiaries, receiving
foreign experts, submitting follow-up reports, and the like. Note that V (y) ∈
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[−g, 1− β − g]4, from which it also follows that g ≤ 1 - if the reservation utility
of the leader is 0.5
The above leader’s utility function is unconventional in the sense that it does
not follow the literature on the subject (see Section 2). In this literature, the
utility function chosen for the recipient government does not include an expected
punishment component and is typically a simple altruistic function which is
sometimes supposed to describe what Foster and Rosenzweig (2002) have called
a “traditional aristocratic governance structure”. The coefficient representing the
leader’s (government’s) altruism can be interpreted as a governance parameter,
since it reflects the weight given by the leader to the welfare of the community.
The reason why we depart from this practice and the implications of doing so
is discussed in section 6.
4.2 Specifying pi(y)
The outcome of the aid program observed by the donor is :
x = (1− y) + u
where u is a random measurement error with cdf Fu(). Knowing that function,
the donor is able to infer the distribution of probability of y given the observed
outcome x.
The donor infers the probability of fraud, say y > Y , where Y is an arbitrary
threshold, from observing x knowing Fu().
Pr {y > Y } = Pr {(1− x) + u > Y } = 1− Fu [Y − (1− x)]
Punishing will occur if this probability is above some threshold 1− θ, that is:
F [Y − (1− x)] ≤ θ ⇐⇒ x ≤ 1− Y + F−1u (θ) = ξ (2)
In other words, the donor senses fraud when the observed output is below some
threshold, ξ, that depends on Y and θ.
Given such behavior by the donor, the probability pi(y) for the fraud to be
detected as a function of the fraud y is given by :
pi(y) = Pr {x = 1− y + u ≤ ξ} = Fu [y − (1− ξ)] (3)
In what follows, we assume that Fu() has the ususal S-shape form over some
support interval [−d,+d], being convex in a first part of the interval and concave
over the rest of the interval. As the probability function pi() is initially convex,
it can be seen that the utility function of the leader in (1) is concave for low
enough values of y.
4Indeed, the minimum value of V (y) is −g (when y = 0), and its maximum value is 1−β−g
(when y = 1, and the leader is lucky enough to have his or her fraud undetected).
5If β is close to zero, indeed, the maximum value of the leader’s utility is 1−g. If this were
negative, the leader would be better off refusing the aid money.
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Non-degenerate solutions of the models to be analyzed always occur in the
convex part of the fraud detection probability function. To simplify, we shall
assume that this function is indeed quadratic : pi(y) = y2/a2, where a may
be interpreted as the natural variance of the outcome of the aid program. Of
course, this is for y being in the interval [0, a]. A more rigorous specification
actually would be:
pi(y) = Inf
(
y2/a2, 1
)
In what follows, only the ’interior’ specification pi(y) = y2/a2, where non-
degenerate solutions are found, will be considered. The implications of con-
sidering the counter-intuitive corner solution pi(y) = 1 are discussed in section
6.
Assume now that the donor is able to modify the distribution of the outcome
random component, u, through monitoring. A convenient assumption is that
the donor can scale the random component up or down by a factor b ≥ 0. The
cdf of the noise in the outcome observation, v = u/b, is now given by:
Fv(v) = Fu(v/b)
When the degree of monitoring precision is explicitly taken into account (in-
stead of being implicitly set to the value one, as before), we obtain the following,
more general form of the detection probability function:
pi(by) =
(by)2
a2
(4)
Finally, it makes sense to require that the probability of fraud detection be
zero when there is no fraud.This implies that Fu [−(1− ξ)] = 0, which permits
identifying ξ once the original distribution of the noise, Fu(), is known. A more
general specification where the leader can embezzle a proportion h of aid with
no probability of being detected is discussed in section 6.
4.3 The leader’s behaviour
The interior solution of the leader’s program, (1), is given by dV/dy = Vy =
1 − 2βy − bγpi′(by) = 0. When pi = (by)2/a2, this yields the optimal level of
embezzlement, y˜(b, γ):
y˜(b, γ) =
1
2(β + b2γ/a2)
(5)
It will be convenient in what follows to define a measure of aggregate external
discipline imposed by the donor:
ϕ =
b2γ
a2
(6)
10
The optimal fraud can then be written simply as:
y˜(b, γ) =
1
2(β + ϕ)
(7)
Note that, at this optimum and according to intuition, the marginal utility
of fraud, V y, is a decreasing function of both the internal and the external
discipline. It follows that the share embezzled by the leader decreases when
either internal governance, β, improves or the donor tightens his disciplining
instruments (the monitoring precision and/or the amount of the punishment).
It also increases with the noise, a, in the measurement of the aid outcome, since
this diminishes the probability that the fraud will be detected.
In the above argument, we have assumed that the behavior of the leader was
such that the quadratic probability of detection of the fraud is below unity. The
issue of a degenerate corner solution at pi(by) = 1 is discussed in section 6.
Note that the corner solution y = 1 has been ignored in this description
of the solution. One way of ruling it out is to assume that β ≥ 1/2,which we
will do. In other words, we assume that, even without external disciplining, the
leader never steals the whole aid fund. On the other hand, the leader will never
choose to refrain from cheating altogether because dV/dy is necessarily positive
when y = 0.
4.4 Optimal punishment/monitoring by the donor
Let C(b) be the cost of monitoring the use of aid, C() being increasing and
convex. C(b) is thus the cost incurred by the donor per unit of aid to achieve a
certain level of precision in detecting fraud. The higher the precision b desired
by the donor the higher the cost to be incurred and also the higher the marginal
cost of enhancing precision. Likewise, D(γ), with D() increasing and convex,
is the cost per unit of aid for the donor of imposing a level of punishment γ
on the leader. D(γ) may include the cost involved in the participation in an
information-sharing network designed to ensure publicity about fraudulent acts
committed by unscrupulous leaders or the harsh image that too severe a donor
would give to its constituency or development NGOs. Whereas the monitoring
cost, C(b), is incurred ex ante, since it is aimed at detecting fraudulent behavior,
the cost of punishment for the donor, D(γ), is incurred ex post, that is, only
after the actual detection of a fraud which occurs with probability pi().
The objective of the donor is assumed to depend logarithmically on people’s
welfare in the recipient country and on the cost of disciplining the leader. It is
therefore written as:
Maxγ,b Log [w + T (1− y˜(γ, b))]− C(b)T − pi (by˜(γ, b))D(γ)T (8)
where w is the per capita income of the community without aid and T the total
amount of aid per capita, which is taken as exogenous.
The specification (8) is voluntarily simplified. Calling Γ the total cost of
managing aid, that is discipling the leader, a more general specification of the
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donor’s objective would be:
Max W [w + T (1− y˜(γ, b)), T + Γ] (9)
with this function being increasing and concave with respect to its first argument
and decreasing and convex with respect to its second argument, i. e. the total
cost of aid. In this specification both the amount transferred and its cost would
be endogenous. The specification (8) may be considered as a special case of
(9), where W is assumed to be additive and linear with respect to its second
argument. Also, the maximization may be assumed to be sequential, only the
first step where the net transfer T is taken to be exogenous being considered
in this paper. In Section 6, some clues will be provided on the implications of
considering this more general specification.
Maximization as described by (8) must take place under the participation
constraint of the leader. Assuming that the leader’s utility function is linearly
homogeneous in T (it is equal to the utility derived from one aid unit times
the number of aid units available), and that the cost of handling T units of aid
is T times the unit cost (= gT ), we may continue to express the participation
constraint as before:
y˜(γ, b)− βy˜2(γ, b)− γpi [by˜(γ, b)]− g ≥ V 0 (10)
where V 0 is the reservation utility of the leader per unit of aid which will be
assumed to be 0, except otherwise specified. In other words, the donor must
make sure that the leader can at least cover the cost of handling aid. Using the
expression of the indirect utility V ∗ above, and considering an interior solution
(regime 1), the participation constraint writes simply:
1/(4(β + ϕ))− g ≥ 0 (11)
As far as the participation constraint of the donor is concerned, we will
assumed that the parameters of the model are such that, at equilibrium:
Log [w + T (1− y˜(γ, b))]− C(b)T − pi(by˜).D(γ)T > Log(w) (12)
In other words, we assume that the income per head in the recipient country
is sufficiently low and/or the parameters of the cost functions are sufficiently
small to make the donor’s participation constraint automatically satisfied.
Now, the Lagrangian of the donor’s maximization problem can be written:
Λ = Log [w + T (1− y˜(γ, b))]− C(b)T − pi(by˜)D(γ)T
+µ
{
y˜(γ, b)− βy˜2(γ, b)− γpi [by˜(γ, b)]− g} (13)
where µ is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the leader’s participation
constraint. Two situations can then arise depending upon whether this con-
straint is binding at equilibrium or not. The case where it is binding reflects
conditions under which the monitoring and punishment technology is cheap
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enough to allow the donor to prevent the leader from obtaining any surplus.
Conversely, when the cost of this technology is too high, the donor will not find
it profitable to put the leader at his reservation utility. In the exposition that
follows, we start by examining the latter, more general case, which also turns
out to be the more analytically complex.
5 The general case: the leader’s participation
constraint is not binding
As the leader’s participation constraint is not binding at equilibrium, the La-
grangean coefficient µ is nil in (13). By replacing the probability pi by its value
in terms of the donor’s instruments, the donor’s problem can be rewritten as
follows:
Max
b,ϕ
W = Log
[
w + T (1− 1
2 (β + ϕ)
)
]
−TC(b)−TD(γ)
[
1
4
b2
a2
1
(β + ϕ)2
]
(14)
with ϕ =
b2γ
a2
To simplify the analysis in this section, we set a = 1 and we specify the two
cost functions as convex power functions:
C(b) =
cbq
q
, D(γ) =
dγm
m
, with q ≥ 1, m ≥ 1
Then, using the definition of ϕ above to express γ as a function of b and ϕ,
the donor’s problem becomes:
Max
b,ϕ
W = Log
[
w + T (1− 1
2 (β + ϕ)
)
]
− Tcb
q
q
− Td
4m
b2
(β + ϕ)2
ϕm
b2m
(15)
Proceeding sequentially, we first optimize this function with respect to b for
given ϕ. This yields the total cost Γ(ϕ) of implementing the external discipline
at the level ϕ.
Γ(ϕ) = Min b Tc
bq
q
+
Td
4m
b2(1−m)
(β + ϕ)2
ϕm for given ϕ (16)
the solution of which is given by:
b∗(ϕ) =
[
d
c
m− 1
2m
ϕm
(β + ϕ)2
] 1
q+2(m−1)
(17)
and, after plugging this expression back into (16), we obtain the following ex-
pression for the cost of the external discipline:
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Γ(ϕ) = B
[
ϕm
(β + ϕ)2
]p
(18)
where:
B =
Tc1−pdp2−p−1
q(m− 1)1−pmp [(m− 1)2 + q]; p =
q
q + 2(m− 1) (19)
For future use, the corresponding marginal cost can be expressed as:
Γ′(ϕ) =
η
ϕ
Γ(ϕ); with η = p
[
m− 2ϕ
β + ϕ
]
(20)
where η is the elasticity of the cost with respect to external discipline, ϕ.
The original maximization problem (15) writes now:
Max
ϕ
W = Log
[
w + T (1− 1
2 (β + ϕ)
)
]
− Γ(ϕ) = U(ϕ)− Γ(ϕ) (21)
where U(ϕ) can be interpreted as the donor’s utility of disciplining the leader.
An interior solution, if it exists, is then obtained by equalizing the corresponding
marginal utility of the external discipline, and the marginal cost, Γ′(ϕ). But a
corner solution at ϕ =0 cannot be excluded.
It turns out that the type and properties of the optimal external discipline
strongly depend on the curvature of the cost functions or on the parameters m
and q. Four cases have to be distinguished depending on whether the convexity
of the cost functions, C(b) and D(γ), is more or less pronounced than that of the
quadratic function that describes the probability of detection , pi() - i.e; whether
m or q are greater or smaller than 2 - and whether the solution is interior or at
the 0 corner.
5.1 Case m < 2.
It can be seen from (18) and (19) thatm < 2 implies that the cost of the external
discipline tends towards zero when its level becomes infinitely large, whereas the
utility U(ϕ) is also maximal. It follows that the optimal value of the external
discipline is infinite. This is easy to interpret. The conditionm < 2 implies that,
as the level of external discipline is raised, the cost of punishment for the donor
increases less quickly than the probability of actually incurring that cost (i.e.
the probability of detection) decreases. Thus, the expected cost of punishment
tends towards zero when the punishment becomes infinitely large. This case of
extreme severity in which the leader is actually deterred from embezzling aid
money is analogous to the result of extreme penalty in the theory of optimal
crime prevention - see, for instance, Garoupa (1997).
Yet, in the present case where the leader has the possibility to opt out of the
aid program, this case is irrelevant. Clearly, the participation constraint of the
leader cannot be satisfied when he/she gets no benefit from aid -y˜ = 0 as ϕ→∞
from (7)-, but must pay a cost, g. If the donor insists in giving aid to the recipient
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country, then it must set the external discipline at the level consistent with the
leader’s participation constraint, which is the case studied in the next section.
5.2 Case m ≥ 2, q > 2.
We now come back to the more realistic case where m ≥ 2 and write the first-
order condition of the donor’s optimization problem. Differentiating the first
term in (21) yields the marginal utility:
U ′(ϕ) =
(β + ϕ)−2
w + T (1− 12(β+ϕ) )
(22)
which is monotonically decreasing with respect to ϕ and, as could be expected,
tends towards zero when ϕ tends towards infinity - see Figures 1 to 4.
If strictly positive, the optimal level of the external discipline, ϕ, is then
given by equalizing the marginal cost defined above with the marginal utility:
U ′(ϕ) = Γ′(ϕ) (23)
It turns out that the analysis of that first-order optimality condition is rather
intricate. Knowing the shape of the marginal utility function, a simpler way to
proceed consists of considering the relative value R(ϕ) = Γ′(ϕ)/U ′(ϕ) of the
marginal cost with respect to the marginal utility rather than both of them
separately. An interior solution is then given by equalizing this ratio to unity.
From the set of equations(18), (19) and (20), and from equation (22), it comes
after rearranging that:
R(ϕ) = Bp [(m− 2)ϕ+mβ]
[
ϕmp−1
(β + ϕ)2p−1
] [
w + T (1− 1
2(β + ϕ)
)
]
(24)
If q > 2 andm ≥ 2, as assumed in this subsection, it can be shown that the three
terms in square brackets are increasing functions of ϕ and R(ϕ) increases mono-
tonically from zero to infinity when ϕ goes from zero to infinity - see Appendix
B. It follows that R(ϕ) necessarily goes through unity. For the corresponding
value of ϕ, the marginal cost is equal to the marginal utility. Thus, there is
a single intersection point between the marginal cost and the marginal utility
curve, and therefore, a single (interior) solution to the optimality condition (23).
Moreover, the marginal cost curve crosses the marginal utility curve from be-
low so that the second order condition for optimality is satisfied, whatever the
actual shape of the marginal cost curve - see Figure 1.
We now look at the comparative statics of this interior solution with respect
to the internal discipline β. Several interesting results emerge. Combined with
the existence result, the first one may be stated as follows :
Theorem 1. (Existence and substitutability) If q > 2 and m ≥ 2, the optimal
external discipline is strictly positive and is a substitute to the internal discipline:
an increase in internal discipline, β, diminishes the optimal external discipline,
ϕ.
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At first sight, this property seems very intuitive. With a better internal
discipline, the leader allocates a larger share of aid to the grassroot population
in the recipient country, and this reduces the marginal utility of the external
discipline for the donor. Without major change in the marginal cost, the ex-
ternal discipline should diminish. What is less evident, however, is the way the
marginal cost is modified. It can be seen from (20) that an increase in β has two
opposite effects on the marginal cost. On the one hand, it increases the elastic-
ity, η, of the cost with respect to the level of external discipline but, on the other
hand, it reduces the ratio Γ(ϕ)/ϕ (bearing in mind that mp − 1 = (m−1)(q−2)q+2(m−1) ,
which is always positive under the assumed conditions). Of course, the substi-
tutability between internal and external disciplines is reinforced if the maginal
cost increases, that is, if the former effect is stronger than the latter. In the
opposite case where the marginal cost decreases with β, it is shown in Appendix
B that it decreases less than the marginal utility, so that the substitutability
between internal and external disciplines holds in that case too.
The question now arises of the extent of the substitution of internal by
external discipline. Is it only partial, or could it possibly overshoot the initial
change in internal discipline? The substitution is partial (under-substitution) if
the total discipline β + ϕ increases when β increases, or:
−1 ≤ dϕ
dβ
≤ 0 (25)
Alternatively, over-substitution occurs when :
dϕ
dβ
≤ −1 (26)
In this second case, therefore, overall discipline falls despite the fact that its
internal component, β, has increased.
A rather simple condition determines whether over- or under-substitution
occurs (see Appendix B):
Theorem 2. (under- and over-compensation) An increase in internal disci-
pline, β, is always compensated by a drop in external discipline, ϕ. There is
under-compensation, i.e. total discipline, β + ϕ, increases , iff:
η > 1 (27)
There is over-compensation, i.e. total discipline, β + ϕ, decreases, otherwise.
In this second eventuality, the optimal level of fraud increases despite the higher
level of internal discipline.
A formal proof of the above theorem is given in Appendix B. An intuitive
proof is as follows. Consider the equilibrium condition (23) and a small simul-
taneous change in internal and external discipline leaving the total discipline
unchanged: ∆β + ∆ϕ = 0 or ∆ϕ = −∆β. Clearly, the marginal utility is un-
changed. This is not true of the marginal cost, though . Since η is the elasticity
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of the total cost, the marginal cost may be approximated by Γ′ = ηϕη−1 , and
the change in the marginal cost by ∆Γ′ = −η(η − 1)ϕη−2∆β . If η = 1, equi-
librium has not been disrupted and there is no need for a further change in ϕ.
There is perfect substitution between internal and external discipline. If η > 1,
the marginal cost has moved down and it is thus necessary to increase ϕ (that
is, ϕ falls to a smaller extent than what is needed to keep β + ϕ constant) in
order to get back to equilibrium. There is under-compensation: total discipline
therefore goes up together with internal discipline, yet it increases to a smaller
extent. Finally, the marginal cost moves up if η < 1, which requires a drop in ϕ
beyond what allows to keep β+ϕ constant if equilibrium is to be re-established.
There is then overcompensation and the total discipline falls despite the fact
that the internal discipline has improved.
The intuition of this apparently paradoxical result is simple. When inter-
nal discipline increases, the fraud committed by the leader decreases, and the
grassroots receive more aid so that the marginal utility of the donor falls. To
re-establish equilibrium, the donor must reduce its marginal cost, which he does
by lowering ϕ. By how much depends on the elasticity of the marginal cost,
which depends itself on the convexity of the cost function, which is related to its
elasticity. If it is large, the change in ϕ needed to reequilibrate the optimality
condition is small and the change in the overall discipline remains positive. If
the elasticity of the cost function is small, however, re-establishing optimality
requires a large change in ϕ, which may lead to the a decline in the overall
discipline. Note, however, that things are slightly more complicated since the
elasticity of the cost function actually depends itself on both the internal and
external disciplines. Thus, condition (27) is a condition on the whole set of
parameters of the model.
An important consequence of Theorem 2 is the following :
Theorem 3. (non-monotonicity) The relationship between internal discipline
(β) and total discipline (β + ϕ) or the level of the fraud (1/2)(β + ϕ)−1 is
not necessarily monotonous. If m ≥ 2 and q > 2 and if initially there is
over-substitution of internal by external discipline and the optimized fraud is an
increasing function of β, both properties are likely to revert at some stage as β
increases.
The proof - see Appendix B - directly follows from Theorems 1 and 2 and
from the definition of η as given by (20). Notice first that the elasticity η is
a decreasing function of (ϕ/β + ϕ). Second, it is evident that (ϕ/β + ϕ) is a
decreasing function of β since dϕ/dβ < 0 on the basis of Theorem 1. It follows
that dη/dβ > 0. As β increases, η moves from smaller to larger values so that
under-compensation follows over-compensation when internal discipline in the
recipient country improves. The turning point is given by:
η = 1 or
ϕ
β + ϕ
=
(m− 1) (q − 2)
2q
Clearly, the more convex are the cost curves (the larger the values of m
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and/or q), the less likely over-compensation will occur, which is according to
the intuitive explanation of Theorem 2 above.
Considering now the comparative statics with respect to the other parame-
ters of the model, the following results are easily obtained:
Theorem 4. (other comparative statics) The external discipline is a decreasing
function of the monitoring and punishment cost parameters, c and d, and of the
income of the recipient country. The external discipline is also decreasing with
the size of the transfer.
The proof is immediate from differencing (23) with respect to B and ϕ.
That higher values of the cost parameters reduce the extent of the external
discipline is rather obvious. What is perhaps less evident is that the initial
income of the population in the recipient country has the same effect. This is
easily understood, though. Other things being equal, it can be seen on (22) that
an increase in the income of the population, w, causes the marginal utility of
the donor to fall. Equilibrium is re-established by reducing the discipline so as
to lower the marginal cost. Put in the converse manner, the optimal external
discipline is more severe for poorest countries with the same level of intrinsic
governance, the size of the transfer being the same.
Regarding the effect of a change in the amount of aid transferred, the proof
is again straightforward. Bearing in mind the definition of B given in (19), it
is obvious from (23) that the marginal cost of external discipline, Γ′, increases
with T (the increase is strictly proportional). As for the the marginal utility,
(22) implies that it unambiguously decreases as T rises. Clearly, optimality is
re-established by reducing external discipline.
Getting now into the detail of the external disciplining policy, the following
result holds (see Appendix B for the proof):
Corollary 1. The optimal levels of monitoring and punishment both decrease
monotonically with the level of internal discipline.
Finally, one may wonder how the individual disciplining instruments react
to the cost parameters, c and d. The following results are easily established and
fit common sense.
Corollary 2. The monitoring and the punishment are decreasing functions of
their own cost. However, whether they are gross complements or substitutes is
ambiguous.
Take the case of the optimal monitoring, given by (17). An increase in c
clearly reduces the extent of monitoring for given external discipline, ϕ. As the
external discipline falls with the two cost parameters, and as ϕm/(β+ϕ)2 varies
in the same direction as ϕ (since it is assumed that m ≥ 2), the overall effect of
a change in c on b∗ is negative. The corresponding two effects when the cost of
punishment increases are opposite to each other. Hence the ambiguity.
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5.3 Case m ≥ 2 and q ≤ 2
Let us consider first the case where q is strictly less than 2. In that case, it can be
seen from (18) and (20) that the marginal cost becomes increasingly large when
ϕ becomes infinitely small (since mp − 1 < 0 when q < 2). The ratio function
R(ϕ) is thus U-shaped going from infinity when ϕ = 0 to infinity when ϕ =∞.
In between, it is shown in Appendix B that R(ϕ) goes through a minimum for
some value ϕm. Two cases can therefore arise. Either this minimum is above
unity, R(ϕm) > 1, in which case the optimal discipline is the ’corner solution’
ϕ = 0 since the marginal cost is then everywhere above the marginal utility - see
Figure 2. Or the minimum is below unity, in which case the marginal cost curve
crosses the marginal utility curve twice. However, only the second intersection
point, ϕI , satisfies the second-order optimality condition - see Figure 3. It is
shown in Appendix B that the optimum is of the type described by ϕI , if the
internal discipline parameter, β, is sufficiently low, or if the cost parameters, c
and d, and/or utility parameters w and T are sufficiently small. It is ϕ = 0
if they are not. In other words, the optimal discipline is zero if the internal
governance is good enough, or if the cost of the aid delivery and/or the income
level in the income recipient country and the size of the tranfer are high enough.
The following theorem follows from these properties.
Theorem 5. (Corner solution) If m > 2 and q < 2 then there exist values β
(≥ 1/2) and ϕ(> 0) of the internal and external discipline such that the optimal
discipline, ϕ∗, satisfies:
ϕ∗ = 0 if β ≥ β and ϕ∗ ≥ ϕ if β < β
The set of values of the model parameters (c, d, w, T ) for which β is strictly
above its minimum 1/2 is non-empty.
The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix B. The key property behind
it is that the marginal cost of external discipline becomes infinite at ϕ = 0 when
q < 2 . This property can easily be understood with the following argument.
Consider the case where the punishment, γ, is fixed. The cost function then
becomes:
Γb(ϕ) = Tc
bq
q
+
Td
4m
γmb2
(β + b2γ)2
with b2γ = ϕ
and, after substituting b by (ϕ/γ)1/2:
Γb(ϕ) =
Tc
q
(
ϕ
γ
)q/2
+
Td
4m
γm−1ϕ
(β + ϕ)2
In other words, if the monitoring cost function is convex with respect to the
monitoring intensity, b, whenever q > 1, the same property does not necessarily
hold with respect to external discipline, ϕ. We additionally need that q > 2. If
this condition is not satisfied, the marginal cost, Γ′(ϕ), is a decreasing function
of external discipline for low values of ϕ, and it tends towards infinity when
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ϕ goes to 0, thus allowing for the possibility of a corner solution at ϕ = 0.
What matters here is that the behaviour of the leader depends on the square
of the monitoring precision through b2γ, -our definition of external discipline-
because of the quadratic specification of the probability of fraud detection. An-
other specification of that probability would have yielded a different necessary
condition for the existence of a corner solution at ϕ = 0.6
For a given value of β, another intuitive interpretation of the preceding
theorem is that, when the cost function is concave with respect to total discipline
(q < 2), the optimal discipline will be the corner solution zero whenever the
marginal cost is high in comparison with the marginal utility curve, due to
large unit costs of monitoring and punishment and/or high initial income and
net aid transfer.
An interesting implication of Theorem 5 is the discontinuity it implies for
the way external discipline depends on the parameters of the model. When the
quality of governance decreases from some high enough level, the optimal disci-
pline is zero until some threshold is met. From that point, it possibly switches
to a strictly positive value. Of course, the same property holds with respect to
the other parameters. Thus, a small drop in the quality of the governance of a
country, in its initial level of income, or in the volume of aid, may trigger such
a jump in external discipline. On the other hand, there may be combinations
of parameters such that there is no such discontinuity, the corner solution at
ϕ = 0 applying for all values of β (so that β in the preceding theorem is actually
tending towards 1/2, the minimum value set in Section 3.3).
It bears emphasis that the discontinuity does not modify the comparative
static results obtained in the preceding case with q > 2. For instance, it is still
the case that exernal and internal disciplines are substitutes, but in a weak sense
when located at the corner solution, and with a possible discontinuity at some
level of the internal discipline.
A natural question that arises is whether Theorem 3 on over- and under-
compensation of internal by external discipline still applies. It is evident that no
compensation occurs at the corner solution, whereas a huge over-compensation
occurs at the discontinuity threshold, β. On the other hand, it can easily be
shown that over-compensation always holds for an interior solution. To see this,
it is sufficient to notice from (19) and (20) that η < 1 whenever q < 2. Indeed,
the proof of Theorem 3 does not rely on the condition q > 2 and, by definition
of the elasticity η, the condition η < 1 requires that:
ϕ
β + ϕ
>
(m− 1) (q − 2)
2q
which always hods if q < 2. Since a low value of q implies little or non convex-
ity of the cost function, the result is according to the aforementioned intutive
6If the value of 2 plays a critical, threshold role for the parameters m and q in the above
discussion, it is only because we have chosen to specify the probability of fraud detection as
a quadratic function of fraud. Had we chosen pi = b3y3 instead of pi = b2y2, for example,
the expression for external discipline would have been ϕ = b3γ instead of ϕ = b2γ, and the
threshold value for the parameters m and q would have been 3 instead of 2.
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interpretation given to Theorem 3.
The following theorem can therefore be stated:
Theorem 6. If m > 2 and q < 2, and if an interior solution prevails (β < β¯),
over-compensation of internal by external discipline always occurs.
The pivotal role of the shape of the monitoring cost function (the cost
component that is combined with the detection probability) behind the over-
compensation outcome is now plainly in evidence.
It remains to see how the preceding argument is modified in the limit case
where m > 2 and q = 2. Since this implies mp− 1 = 0, it can easily be seen on
(24) that the marginal cost/marginal utility ratio function is now everywhere
increasing as in the case where m > 2. Yet, it does not start from zero but from
a strictly positive value when ϕ = 0 (see Figure 4). If that value is above unity,
the optimal solution is the corner solution ϕ = 0. In the opposite case, there is
an interior solution with the same properties as above for q < 2. The condition
for a corner solution writes:
Bpmβ2(1−p)
[
w + T (1− 1
2(β)
]
> 1
In line with our expectation, this case is all the more likely as the cost parameters
c, d and/or the aid to income ratio T/w are high enough.
6 The particular case: the leader’s participation
constraint is binding
The donor maximization problem now includes the leader’s participation con-
straint. Bearing in mind (11) which was obtained by substituting the optimal
level of fraud, y˜, into (10), we have that:
V (y˜) =
1
4(β + ϕ)
− g ≥ 0 or ϕ ≤ 1
4g
− β
It is assumed here that the solution of the general case (15) does not satisfy
this constraint. Since that solution does not depend on the cost of managing
aid, g, it is sufficient to assume that this cost is sufficiently high for the leader’s
participation constraint to be binding. The donor has then no choice anymore,
and the leader will only agree to manage the aid amount if external discipline
is below the threshold ϕ = 1/4g − β.
The donor’s maximization problem is thus trivial as it boils down to min-
imizing the cost of imposing that level of discipline. This problem was solved
above. It comes from (17) that the optimal monitoring is given by:
b∗∗ =
[
d
c
m− 1
m
8g2
(
1
4g
− β
)m] 1q+2(m−1)
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whereas the optimal punishment is given by :
γ∗∗ =
( 14g − β)
b∗∗2
=
[
cmg−2
8d(m− 1)
] 2
q+2(m−1) ( 1
4g
− β
) q−2
q+2(m−1)
The comparative-static analysis is rather straightforward and yields the fol-
lowing results. First, when the level of internal discipline, β, increases, the
external discipline, ϕ, is adjusted so as to maintain total discipline, β + ϕ,
constant. We have perfect substitutability between the two types of discipline,
instead of under- or over-substituability as before. As a consequence, monitoring
decreases as internal discipline improves. However, this holds for punishment
only when q > 2.
Second, the two disciplining instruments are negatively affected by an in-
crease in their respective cost, and they are clearly gross substitutes.
Third, neither external discipline nor the levels of the disciplining instru-
ments are affected by the size of aid or the poverty of the recipient country. The
only parameter other than β that affects ϕ is the unit cost of handling aid for
the leader, g. When g rises, the donor is forced to reduce external discipline in
order to keep the leader at his reservation utility. Moreover, it is easy to show
that δb∗∗/δg < 0, and it is even more evident that δγ∗∗/δg < 0 when q > 2.
We are now in a position to summarize the results obtained under the as-
sumption of a binding participation constraint of the leader, allowing for a
comparison with the case of a non-binding constraint.
Theorem 7. When the donor is able to put the leader of the recipient coun-
try at his reservation utility, changes in external discipline exactly compensate
changes in internal discipline, and this is true regardless of the initial level of
internal governance. When q > 2 , the optimal levels of both monitoring and
punishment decrease as internal governance improves. Moreover, they decrease
as their respective cost increases, and they are gross substitutes. The size of
the aid transfer and the income of the population in the recipient country do
not influence external discipline, but the unit cost of handling aid for the leader
does. When this cost increases, external discipline is reduced as reflected in a
decrease of the levels of both disciplining instruments. When q 6 2 , punishment
increases with both the internal discipline and the cost of managing aid.
It remains to specify when the participation constraint is binding. This will
be the case if the marginal utility of the external discipline is above its marginal
cost, when the external discipline is at the level that makes the leader indifferent
between participating or not. Namely:
(4g)2
w + T (1− 2g) ≥
η
ϕ
B
[
ϕm
(β + ϕ)2
]p
with (β + ϕ) = 1/4g and η = p(m− 2ϕ
β + ϕ
)
Practically, the participation constraint is more likely to be binding as the man-
agement cost of aid, g, is high and the level of the external discipline in the
unconstrained model tends to be high, i.e. low levels of internal discipline, low
22
income of the population in the recipient country, and low costs of disciplining
instruments (since B is a positive function of c and d).
Notice carefully that, because the above condition involves a reasoning at
the margin, it does not apply to the case where m < 2 which yields a corner
solution at ϕ = ∞ and, therefore, makes the leader’s participation constraint
binding (see Section 4). I is also worth noting that, when m > 2, the RHS of the
inequality can never take a negative value, so that the possibility of the binding
equilibrium depends on the entire set of the model’s parameters.7
A final remark concerns a simplifying assumption that we have made earlier
in order to avoid overburdening our analytical formulas, thus positing that a = 1.
When a is left free to take on any value, we find that δb/δa > 0, and δγ/δa > 0,
whether the participation constraint of the leader is binding or not. In words,
an increase in the natural variance of the outcome of the aid transfer induces
the donor to use his two disciplining instruments more intensively.
7 Remarks and extensions
7.1 Alternative specifications of the objective of the donor
Consider the following additive specification of the objective of the donor, more
general than the one used in the analysis:
MaxT,ϕ U [w + T (1− y˜)]− V (T + Γ) (28)
where V is an increasing and convex function of the total cost of aid for the
donor and where y˜ is now taken to be a function of ϕ. The first-order conditions
of this problem write:
−U ′T y˜′ = V ′Γ′ (29)
U(1− y˜) = V ′ (30)
Eliminating V ′ between these two conditions lead to:
− T y˜
′
(1− y˜) = Γ
′ (31)
As Γ′ is proportional to T , the solution of that equation has the property that
the optimal discipline does not depend on the size of the transfer, T , nor on
7Indeed, the only term that can possibly be negative is η/ϕ, which can be written as:
p
(
m
ϕ
− 2
β + ϕ
)
and, after substituting:
4pg
(
m− 2 + 8βg
1− 4βg
)
For the above expression to be negative, we must have that m < 2(1 − 4βg), which is
obviously impossible when m > 2 since 1 − 4βg < 1. Therefore, the sufficient condition that
would make the inequality hold (η/ϕ < 0) can never be satisfied when m > 2.
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the initial income of the grassroots, w. But all other properties of the optimal
discipline derived in the text hold in this case too. In other words, there is some
separability between the optimal discipline and the optimal transfer problem.
The optimal discipline problem does not depend on the size of the transfer
whereas the reverse does not hold true. The optimal transfer is given by equation
(30) for the level of the optimal discipline given by (31).
7.2 Allowing for a corner solution in pi(by)
In Section 4 and 5, we have implicitly assumed that at equilibrium the probabil-
ity of fraud detection is less than unity. How are our results affected if we allow
for the possibility that this probability reaches its maximum value is the ques-
tion that we need to address in order to make our analysis complete. Getting
back to the complete specification of the probability of detection:
pi(by) = Inf
(
b2y2/a2, 1
)
we now prove that the corner solution pi(by) = 1 will never be optimal for the
donor.
First, let us characterize completely the behavior of the leader, including the
corner solution. Given the leader’s objective as stated under (1), there are two
regimes for the leader, depending on which part of the probability of detection
is relevant:
- Limit regime (0): pi(by) = 1. Then, y∗ = y0 = 1/(2β) and V ∗ = V0 =
1/(4β)− γ − g
- Normal regime (1): pi(by) = b2y2/a2. Then, y∗ = y1 = 1/2(β + ϕ) and
V ∗ = V1 = 1/4(β + ϕ)− g
The optimal regime is the one that maximizes V ∗. It is regime 1 if
V0 = 1/(4β)− γ − g ≤ V1 = 1/(4(β + ϕ))− g
After eliminating γ through γ = ϕa2/b2, this is equivalent to:
b2 ≤ 4a2β(β + ϕ) (32)
We can now prove the following theorem:
Theorem 8. It is never in the interest of the donor to allow the leader to settle
in regime 0.
The proof (provided in Appendix C) proceeds in two steps since we have to
show that the donor’s optimal choice is regime 1 whether the leader’s partic-
ipation constraint is binding (the particular case) or not binding (the general
case).
Our task does not end here, however. We must indeed ensure that, in the
general case, the donor maximizes his objective under the constraint that the
leader is maintained in regime 1. Formally, this constraint must be taken into
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account when defining the cost of implementing some predefined level of external
discipline in (16). This problem now writes:
Γ(ϕ) = Min b Tcb
q/q +
Td
4m
b2(1−m)
(β + ϕ)2
ϕm for given ϕ
and subject to : b2 ≤ 4β(β + ϕ)
The latter constraint is binding when the derivative of the cost at b2 =
4β(β + ϕ) is negative. In that case, the donor would like to increase b but
would violate the constraint that maintains the leader in regime 1. Thus, the
constraint is binding whenever:
Tc [4β(β + ϕ)]
(q−1)/2 ≤ Td
2c
m− 1
m
[4β(β + ϕ)]
(1−m)−1/2
(β + ϕ)2
ϕm
This may be rewritten after some transformation as:
∆(ϕ) = ϕm(β + ϕ)−m−1−q/2 ≥ 2q+2m−1βm−1+q/2 m
m− 1
c
d
= ψ
It can be seen that the function ∆(ϕ) has a inverted U-shape with a maximum
at ϕ∗ = mβ/(1 + q/2). In other words, the constraint to maintain the leader
in regime 1 is binding for values of the internal discipline that lie within some
intermediate range. However, there is a case where the preceding inequality is
violated for all values of ϕ. It is when the maximum of ∆(ϕ) at ϕ∗ is below ψ.
It turns out that this condition is equivalent to:
βm+q ≥
(
d
c
)
mm
(
m− 1
m
)
(1 + q/2)1+q/2
(m+ 1 + q/2)(m+1+q/2)2q+2(m−1)
= β∗(m, q, d/c)
This result is stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 9. (normal regime is optimal) There exists a threshold of the internal
discipline above which the constraint of maintaining the leader in the normal
regime is never binding and the solution of the general case applies.
The intuition behind Theorem 10 is rather obvious. For low levels of internal
discipline, the donor would like to impose a high level of external discipline, so
high that the leader in the recipient country would switch to regime 0. As this
would not be a satisfactory outcome for the donor, he imposes the discipline
that makes the leader indifferent between the two regimes. Another way to look
at the condition is through the role of the cost parameters. Since β∗ varies
positively with the ratio d/c, the implication is that the larger the unit cost of
monitoring relative to that of punishment the more likely regime 1 prevails in
an unconstrained manner. And vice-versa if the ratio d/c is high. This is again
according to intuition: when monitoring is costly, the donor is not induced to set
monitoring precision at such a high level that the probability of fraud detection
will reach unity.
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In discussing the general case as we did in Subsection 3.4.2, we implicitly as-
sumed that the above condition is always satisfied. Absent this assumption, the
problem becomes obviously quite intricate since the cost curve Γ() would have
different expressions depending on the value of ϕ. As is evident from the second
point in the aforementioned interpretation, the analytical argument followed to
handle the general case relies on the most intuitive idea that monitoring costs
are significant enough to discourage the donor from choosing perfect detection
of the leader’s fraud.
7.3 Why the case of an altruistic/paternalistic leader has
been ruled out
Instead of the original objective function (1), let us consider the case of an
altruistic or paternalistic leader who attaches a weight α to his own income and
a weight (1−α) to the income accruing to his constituency. This specification is
reminiscent of the so-called “paternalistic altruism” whereby Azam and Laffont
(2003) describe the behavior of local elites in poor countries. In effect, the
weight (1− α) needs not be interpreted strictly as a coefficient of altruism, but
may be alternatively viewed as the bargaining power wielded by the leader’s
constituency (people are able to compel the leader to take their interests into
account). Whichever the interpretation, the leader’s utility function is now
written as follows:
V (y) = αy + (1− α)(1− y)− αγpi(by)− g = y(2α− 1) + (1− α)− αγpi(by)− g
Equivalently, we may write a function adjusted from Azam and Laffont
(2000):
V (y) = y + θ(1− y)− γpi(by)− g
We may then derive the leader’s optimum fraud, assuming that the punish-
ment is strong enough and the monitoring precise enough, so that dV/dy cannot
be positive when y = 1 (and bearing in mind that α must exceed 1/2 for the
problem to be non-trivial in the case of the first specification). With the second
specification, the equivalent of the optimal behavior of the leader (7) now is:
y˜ = (1 − θ)/2ϕ. It is still the case that the optimal fraud decreases with the
altruistic coefficient - or internal discipline- θ and with the external discipline
ϕ.
There is yet a particular problem that arises when an altruistic function is
used to depict the leader’s behavior. The problem is that we cannot be certain
that the indirect utility of the leader decreases when the domestic governance
improves (the altruism coefficient increases). Sticking to the Azam and Laffont’s
specification, we find that the optimal level of the leader’s utility is V I = V (y˜) =
1
2ϕ
(
1− (1−θ)22
)
−g, from which it immediately follows that dV Idθ = 12
(
1−θ
ϕ
)
> 0.
In other words, the leader’s utility always increases as the weight given to the
citizenry is raised while the aid delivery parameters are kept constant.
This is not a peculiarity of simple altruistic functions such as those mentioned
above. For example, let us posit a quite general utility function of the type:
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V (x) = u(x, e) + θU(z, e), where x is the wage the leader receives from the
donor, z is the amount of aid money, and e is the choice variable of the leader
and measures the quality of the leader’s input into the project funded by the
donor. According to one interpretation, e is the level of theft of project funds,
so that lower values of e are associated with higher levels of theft. The function
u(−) represents the ’direct utility’ of the leader, and U(−) the welfare of the
community. It can then be shown that, under reasonable assumptions, given an
optimal choice of e, the leader’s utility increases in θ (see Wahhaj, 2008).
A consequence of the above result is that, in order to maintain the leader at
his reservation utility, the donor will respond to an increase in θ by paradoxically
increasing the external discipline and therefore the monitoring precision and/or
the punishment level, and vice-versa if θ has fallen. When we compute the
comparative-static effects from the donor’s problem, we thus find that at least
one of the effects, δb/δθ or δγ/δθ, remains indeterminate while the other has
the unexpected positive sign.8
Clearly, altruism as reflected in a positive weight given to the utility of the
grassroot population is not a convenient manner to represent domestic gover-
nance. We can nevertheless interpret our own original specification (1) as a
kind of genuinely paternalistic altruism, in the sense that the leader has his own
conception of the way he may harm the community by embezzling funds. The
coefficient β then scales up or down a self-inflicted cost incurred by the leader
when he deprives the community of a part of the aid fund and which is a convex
function of that amount.
7.4 The case of a probability function with a threshold
We assume here that the fraud detection probability function has a threshold
(h > 0) below which fraud cannot be detected. This can be represented by a
simple extension of the original specification of the detection probability (4):
pi(by) = 0 for y ≤ h/b ; pi(by) = (by − h)
2
a2
for h/b ≤ y ≤ 1/b
The model now becomes more complex owing to the possibility of a corner
solution for the leader. This happens when the leader chooses the level of em-
bezzlement in such a way as to avoid the risk of detection altogether. Formally,
the solution of the leader’s programme cannot lie inside the interval [0, h/b], yet
it can be at the corner point yˆ = h/b. Indeed, the first derivative of the leader’s
8Note, incidentally, that the same oddity characterizes Azam-Laffont’s model in which
the optimal amount of aid granted (which is a variable) is shown to depend linearly on the
consumption of the poor as decided by the leader (the government). The authors show that,
when θ increases, the coefficient of the variable component of the aid contract decreases,
pointing to a relaxation of the donor’s discipline, the expected effect. When we complete
the exercise and compute the effect of the same parametric change on the contract’s fixed
component, we nevertheless find that the value of this component may decrease under feasible
conditions (proof available from the authors of the present paper), implying a counter-intuitive
tightening of the donor’s discipline.
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utility function at that point when is dV/dy = 1− 2β(h/b). It follows that the
condition for the corner solution is:
h
b
>
1
2β
(33)
The interpretation of the above is straightforward: the leader chooses the
zero-detection level of fraud if domestic governance is sufficiently strong relative
to that level. For a given degree of monitoring precision, indeed, a large β means
that it is costly for the leader to embezzle too much aid money.
When the condition (33) is violated and the interior solution prevails, we
have:
yˇ =
1
2
[
β + ϕ
(
1− hb
)] (34)
>From the comparaison between (7) and (34), it comes that yˇ > y˜ : as
expected, for given values of the disciplining instruments, the leader embezzles
more when there is a zero-detection zone in the monitoring process.
The leader will be at the corner or at the interior solution depending on the
outcome of the donor’s optimization: the donor will induce the leader to be at
the corner if his own indirect utility is higher than it would be with the interior
solution. As it is evident from (33), the donor uses b but not γ towards such
a purpose. In the case of the corner solution, b∗ is set at a level low enough
to cause h/b∗ to exceed 1/2β, yet at the same time, b should not be too small
since yˇ varies inversely with b at the corner. It thus comes that b∗ = 2βh. As
for γ, its value is indeterminate, a direct consequence of the fact that the cost
D(γ) is incurred only in the event of fraud detection (see Appendix D for the
full proof).9
When the interior solution prevails, so that the equilibrium fraud level is
given by (34), the donor’s optimization programme may not be solved sequen-
tially, even when the leader is put at his reservation utility. Like in the case
where h = 0, some comparative-static effects are impossible to sign unambigu-
ously, and there exists the possibility that b and γ are used as substitutes by
the donor.
8 Conclusion
With the help of a parsimonious principal-agent model, we have studied the
behaviour of a donor who is willing and able to discipline the local elite of a
recipient country. Since our interest mainly lies in understanding the interaction
between the internal and external disciplines, we have specified the objective
function of this elite in such a way that the two types of discipline not only have a
bearing on its income but also lend themselves to an aggregating operation. This
has enabled us to analyse how total discipline is affected by parametric changes
9It can also be shown (see Appendix E) that δb∗/δh > 0: the donor responds to an increase
in the tolerance margin by enhancing monitoring precision. Moreover, δb∗/δβ > 0.
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and, in particular, by a variation in domestic or internal discipline. As expected,
external discipline acts as a substitute for internal discipline and, therefore, when
domestic discipline is increased in the recipient country the donor responds
by reducing the level of external discipline (along both the monitoring and
the punishment dimensions). Yet, since the outcome of governance, measured
as the proportion of aid effectively reaching the poor (or the inverse of local
elite capture), depends on total discipline, the central question is whether the
improvement in internal discipline also results in an increase in total discipline
so that the poor can obtain a higher share of the aid money.
In the table below, we have summarized the main properties of the optimal
disciplining and aid delivery instruments as a function of some of the parameters
of this simple framework.
When the elite’s participation constraint is binding, we reach the rather un-
expected conclusion that internal and external disciplines exactly balance out
with the consequence that total discipline and the share of the poor remain
constant. When the elite is able to retain a surplus from the aid tranfer, our
surprise actually increases. It now becomes possible that an improvement in
domestic discipline is over-compensated by the donor so that total discipline is
paradoxically reduced and elite capture increases. Whether this happens or not
depends on the initial level of internal discipline and on the shapes of the cost
functions, that is, on the technolologies of monitoring and punishment available
to the donor. Moreover, the relationship between internal discipline and total
discipline or the level of elite capture is not necessarily monotonous: if initially
there is over-substitution of internal by external discipline and elite capture is an
increasing function of internal discipline, both properties are likely to revert at
some stage as internal discipline improves. The policy implication is important:
if one wishes to avoid the paradoxical effect according to which the popula-
tion of the recipient country is ’punished’ by the donor for achieving a better
domestic discipline, innovations must ensure that monitoring and punishment
technologies are not too convex in their costs.
On the other hand, if the cost function for punishment exhibits small con-
vexity, the optimal discipline imposed by the donor is such that the punishment
is infinitely large and the monitoring infinitely small. Yet, in that case, it is
unlikely the elite in the recipient country will accept such conditions. In order
to help the poor population in that country, the donor cannot set the external
discipline at a level that exceeds the participation constraint of the elite. The
other extreme solution in which the donor optimally chooses to abstain from
imposing any discipline on the recipient country is another possibility. It is more
likely to arise if the cost function for monitoring exhibits small convexity and
the unit costs of monitoring and punishment are sufficiently high, and/or if the
initial level of living in the recipient country and the size of the aid tranfer are
also sufficiently high.
As attested by the last finding, the model has the original feature of allowing
the study of the effects of aid availability in addition to those of the initial income
level. This is done in a framework where the utility of the donor is concave in the
average income accruing to the recipient population, itself the sum of its stand-
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alone income and the amount of aid money per capita. With respect to the
latter, the most interesting result is the following: when the elite’s participation
constraint is not binding, the optimal external discipline chosen by the donor
decreases with the size of the aid transfer. When this constraint is binding,
however, external discipline is unaffected by the amount of aid money. In other
words, a greater aid supply induces the donor to relax his discipline but only
when he is unable to put the local elite at its reservation utility. The effect
of the initial level of income in the recent country is analogous to that of the
transfer amount: a higher income induces the donor to relax his discipline but
only when the elite’s participation constraint is not binding.
The major implication of the whole endeavor is, therefore, that when gov-
ernance is considered to be partly endogenous to the donor’s effort, no general
prediction can be made about the effect of aid on the donor’s objective (poverty
reduction in this paper). We need to know more about initial levels of domes-
tic governance, the aggregate amount of aid available, and the characteristics of
the disciplining technology to be able to infer more precise testable propositions.
Absent such information, empirical results are likely to be misleading or hard
to interpret.
Table 1: Properties of optimal aid delivery instruments: a summary table
m and q g ’small’ g ’high’
m ≤ 2 ϕ = 1/4g − β
m > 2; q > 2 ϕ < 1/4g − β; ∂ϕ∂β < −1
∂ϕ
∂c ,
∂ϕ
∂d ,
∂ϕ
∂w ,
∂ϕ
∂T < 0
∂b
∂ϕ ,
∂γ
∂ϕ > 0;
∂b
∂c ,
∂γ
∂d < 0
ϕ = 1/4g − β; ∂ϕ∂β = −1
∂b
∂β ,
∂γ
∂β < 0
m > 2; q ≤ 2
c, d or w, T low ϕ < 1/4g − β; ∂ϕ∂β < −1
∂ϕ
∂c ,
∂ϕ
∂d ,
∂ϕ
∂w ,
∂ϕ
∂T < 0
∂b
∂ϕ ,
∂γ
∂ϕ > 0;
∂b
∂c ,
∂γ
∂d < 0
ϕ = 1/4g − β; ∂ϕ∂β = −1
∂b
∂β , < 0,
∂γ
∂β > 0
c, d or w, T high ϕ = 0
30
Figures
Figure 1: Equilibrium of marginal utility and marginal cost of external discipline
when q>2 and m>2
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Figure 2: Equilibrium of marginal utility and marginal cost of external discipline
when m > 2 and q ≤ 2: case where the optimal discipline is ϕ = 0
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Figure 3: Equilibrium of marginal utility and marginal cost of external discipline
when m > 2 and q ≤ 2: case where the optimal discipline is interior solution ϕ0
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Figure 4: Interior and corner equilibria when m > 2 and q = 2
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Appendix A: Notations
The basic notations used in the paper are thus:
T = the size of the aid program;
y = the share of aid appropriated by the leader or the elite of the recipient
country (that is, the extent of ’fraud’): y ∈ [0, 1]
β = the internal governance parameter of the recipient country, or the
cost inflicted by the national community on a leader who behaves fraudulently:
β ∈ [0, 1] ;
b = the degree of precision achieved in the monitoring of the country
leader’s behavior (∈ 0,∞).
a = the quality of the signal about the effect of the aid program
pi(by) = the probability of fraud detection;
h = the threshold below which fraud remains undetected;
γ = the amount of the penalty if the fraud is detected;
g = the cost of handling one unit of aid for the leader;
V ° = the reservation utility of the leader;
C(b) = the cost of monitoring;
D(γ) = the cost of imposing the penalty level γ.
Appendix B: Donor’s behavior when the leader’s
participation constraint is not binding
B1: Proof of Theorem 1
We need first to show that when m ≥ 2 and q > 2 then, the function R(ϕ)is
increasing with ϕ from 0 to ∞. Clearly the first and third bracketed terms in
(24) are increasing functions of ϕ. The logarithmic derivative of the middle term
is given by:
(mp− 1) 1
ϕ
− (2p− 1) 1
β + ϕ
=
(mp− 1)β + (m− 2)pϕ
ϕ(β + ϕ)
which is strictly positive wheneverm ≥ 2 and q > 2. Under the same conditions,
it is the case that R(0) = 0 and R(∞) =∞. The equilibrium condition R(ϕ) = 1
thus has a unique strictly positive solution.
To prove the second part of Theorem 1, we log differentiate the ratio function
R(ϕ) with respect to β and we show that its derivative is positive. As R(ϕ)
is increasing with ϕ, reestablishing equilibrium after an increase in β requires
reducing the external discipline.
Formally:
1
R(ϕ)
∂R(ϕ)
∂β
=
1
Γ′(ϕ)
∂Γ′(ϕ)
∂β
− 1
U ′(ϕ)
∂U ′(ϕ)
∂β
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Differentiating the RHS leads to:
1
Γ′(ϕ)
∂Γ′(ϕ)
∂β
=
m
(m− 2)ϕ+mβ−(2p−1)
1
β + ϕ
;
1
U ′(ϕ)
∂U ′(ϕ)
∂β
= − 2
β + ϕ
−U ′(ϕ)
At equilibrium, we know that Γ′(ϕ) = U ′(ϕ) so that:
sign
{
∂R(ϕ)
∂β
}
= sign
{
m
(m− 2)ϕ+mβ − (2p− 3)
1
β + ϕ
+ U ′(ϕ)
}
As (2p−3) is necessarily negative (since p < 1), it follows that ∂R(ϕ)∂β is positive.
QED
B2: Proof of Theorem 2.
To derive condition (27), differentiate the marginal cost (20) with respect to
ϕ, keeping (β + ϕ) constant, and denote ∆ϕ the corresponding operator. The
intuitive proof in the text is not fully correct because, in using the elasticity of
the cost function, it ignores the fact that this elasticity must now be evaluated
at constant (β + ϕ). More rigorously, it comes that:
∆ϕ(Γ
′)
Γ′
=
∆ϕ(η)
η
− 1
ϕ
+
∆ϕ(Γ)
Γ
But the last term on the RHS can also be written as:
∆ϕ(Γ)
Γ
=
Γ′
Γ
+
2p
β + ϕ
=
η
ϕ
−∆ϕ(η)
Hence the final result:
∆ϕ(Γ
′)
Γ′
=
[
1
ϕ
− ∆ϕ(η)
η
]
(η − 1)
As the cost elasticity η depends negatively on ϕ for given (β + ϕ), the term in
square bracket is positive and Theorem 2 follows. QED.
B4: Proof of Theorem 3
Assume an initial situation such that
ϕ
β + ϕ
>
(m− 1)(q − 2)
2q
(35)
and an increase in β. First, it is plain to see that the LHS of that inequality
decreases with β. Indeed, the first derivative writes:
d
(
ϕ
β+ϕ
)
dβ
=
β dϕdβ − ϕ
(β + ϕ)
2
But as dϕ/dβ is negative from Theorem 2, it follows that ϕ/(β + ϕ) decreases
with β. If, initially, there is over-substitution of internal by external discipline,
the situation is bound to revert as β increases and (35) is less and less likely
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to hold. If so, the optimized fraud increases with β when β is small and most
of the overall discipline is external. At some stage, however, the relationship is
turned upside down and the optimized fraud descreases when β increases.
B5: Proof of Theorem 4
Given in the text.
B7: Proof of Corollary 1
Differentiate (17) logarithmically with respect to ϕ and β. It comes :
sign
∂b∗
∂β
= sign
[
(
m
ϕ
− 2
β + ϕ
).
∂ϕ
∂β
]
− 2
β + ϕ
This expression is negative as long as ϕ reacts negatively to an increase in β,
which is the case according to Theorem 1.
Things are less easy for ∂γ∗/∂β. First, the optimal punishment is defined
by:
γ∗ = ϕ/b∗2
Replacing by (17), it comes that the optimal punishment is given by:
γ∗ = ϕ
[
d
c
m− 1
2m
ϕm
(β + ϕ)2
] −2
q+2(m−1)
Differentiating logarithmically with respect to ϕ and β leads to:
sign(
∂γ∗
∂β
) = sign
[
∂ϕ
∂β
− ϕ/(β + ϕ)
ϕ/(β + ϕ) + (q − 2)/4
]
(36)
After some manipulation, differentiating the equilibrium condition R(ϕ) = 1
with respect to ϕ and β yields:
∂ϕ
∂β
= − ϕ/(β + ϕ)
ϕ/(β + ϕ) +N/M
where:
M =
1
(β + ϕ)− 1 +
4(m− 1) [m(β + ϕ)− ϕ] + 2qϕ
[q + 2(m− 1)] [m(β + ϕ)− 2ϕ] ;
N =
m(m− 1)(q − 2)(β + ϕ)− 2qmϕ
[q + 2(m− 1)] [m(β + ϕ)− 2ϕ]
It is then easily proven thatN/M ≤ (q−2)/4, so that the sign in (36) is negative.
QED
B8: Proof of Corollary 2
In the text.
B9: Proof of Theorem 5
As mp− 1 < 0 when q < 2, R(ϕ) is U-shaped, going from infinity to infinity
when ϕ varies from 0 to∞. To see this, note that the middle bracketed term in
(24) has this U-shape, going through a minimum for ϕ = −(mp−1)β/(m−2)p,
whereas the two other terms are increasing and positive functions of ϕ. It
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follows that R(ϕ) goes through a minimum for some strictly positive value ϕm.
If R(ϕm) > 1, the optimal discipline is the corner solution ϕ = 0. If R(ϕm) ≤ 1,
there exist two solutions to the equation R(ϕ) = 1 but only the largest, for
which R′(ϕ) ≥ 0, can be a local optimum of the donor’s objective. Let ϕI be
that solution and W I the corresponding value of the donor’s objective. The
optimal discipline is then either ϕ = 0 or ϕI depending on whether W I is below
or above the objective of the donor when he/she exerts no external discipline,
W 0 = Log [w + T (1− 1/2β)].
We now want to show that, for some values of the cost parameters c, d, w
and T , there exists a threshold β such that the corner solution ϕ = 0 is optimal
when β is above that threshold. To do so, we prove that: a) R(ϕ) increases
monotonically with β, and b) there are two values of β such that the optimal
external discipline is 0 for the highest value and strictly positive for the smallest
value.
As far as a) is concerned, it is sufficient to notice that q < 2 and m ≥ 2 imply
that 2p− 1 is negative. Indeed,
2p− 1 = q − 2(m− 1)
q + 2(m− 1)
but m ≥ 2 implies that q < 2 ≤ 2(m − 1). It follows that, when m ≥ 2 and
q < 2, R(ϕ) in (24) increases with β. In Figure 3, therefore, the curve R(ϕ)
shifts entirely upwards as β increases.
To prove b) above, consider an arbitrary value β0 of β and β =∞. When β
tends toward infinity, R(ϕ) is increasingly large and therefore everywhere above
unity so that the optimal discipline is undoubtedly 0 in that case. Consider
then the case β = β0 and assume that the cost parameters (c, d) are low enough
so that R(ϕm) < 1. Then evaluate the difference between the donor’s objective
at the corresponding local optimum ϕI and at the corner solution ϕ = 0. It is
given by:
D = Log
[
w + T (1− 1
2(β0+ϕI)
)
w + T (1− 12β0 )
]
− Γ(ϕI)
Note that the first term on the RHS is strictly positive. Then rescale the
cost parameters (c, d) by a scalar λ without changing the external discipline so
that Γ(ϕI) in the preceding expression is itself multiplied by λ - see (18) above.
D = Log
[
w + T (1− 1
2(β0+ϕI)
)
w + T (1− 12β0 )
]
− λΓ(ϕI)
Allowing λ to become increasingly small will necessarily make the difference
D positive at some stage. Now allow the external local optimum ϕI to adjust
to the rescaling of the cost parameters by λ. Since this necessarily raises the
value of the donor’s objective, the difference D remains positive and the new
local optimum is a global optimum. We have thus shown that for any arbitrary
value of β there are parameter values (c, d, w, T ) such that the optimal external
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discipline is given by the (strictly positive) interior solution rather than the
corner solution at 0. Hence, for these parameters values, there exists a threshold
β with the property stated in Theorem 5. Note, however, that there are also
parameter values (c, d, w, T ) such that the global optimum is necessarily the 0
corner solution. In this case, the threshold β is simply the minimum possible
value of β which has been seen to be 1/2 (see Section 3.3). QED
Appendix C: Donor’s behavior when a corner so-
lution in pi(by) is considered
We examine the two possible cases (leader’s participation constraint binding or
not), successively. First consider the general case. The donor’s maximization
problem when the leader is in regime 0 writes:
Max Log(w + T (1− 1
2β
))− Tcbq/q − Tdγmins/m with b2 ≥ 4β(β + ϕ)
The optimum is obtained by allowing γ, and therefore ϕ, to tend towards zero
and by setting the monitoring to the minimum consistent with the leader re-
maining in regime 0, i.e. b = 2β.
Clearly, such a policy with γ = 0+ and b = 2β cannot be optimal for the
donor since it is dominated by the ϕ = γ = b = 0 policy which sets the leader in
regime 1. As seen earlier, the latter is optimal if q ≤ 2 and the unit costs of aid
delivery instruments (c,d) and/or the income of the recipient country and the
size of the transfer (w, T) are large enough. It is itself dominated by a non-zero
external discipline if these conditions are not satisfied.
Consider now the case where the participation constraint of the leader is
binding. If the leader is in regime 0, the participation constraint writes:
V0 = 1/(4β)− γ − g = 0
which sets a value for γ. The donor must then set the monitoring instrument
and the internal dicipline at a level b0 and ϕ0 consistent with regime 0, that is
the opposite of (32). This leads to:
b20 = 4β(β + ϕ0) or b
2
0 =
β
g
and ϕ0 = (
1
4g
− β)
Starting from this situation, imagine however that the donor decides to set
the monitoring at a slightly lower level and the punishment at a slighy higher
level so as to maintain the external discipline constant. This would not change
its costs but would then force the leader to switch from regime 0 to regime 1,
with a discontinuity in the fraud from 1/2β to 1/2(β+ϕ0). The leader would be
indifferent between these two situations and the donor would clearly be better
off with the same costs and a higher level of utility. QED
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Appendix D: The corner solution when the fraud
detection function has a threshold
We differentiate (13) with respect to b and γ, bearing in mind that y˜ = h/b in
the case the corner solution obtains. We immediately see that the second first-
order condition is always equal to zero (all the terms actually vanish), regardless
of the value taken on by γ, which is therefore indeterminate. As for the first
equilibrium condition, since not only pi(by) but also dpi/dy are zero at the corner
point, it takes the simple following form:
h
b2
− C ′(b)G
T
+ µ
h
b2
(
2β
h
b
− 1
)
G
T
≤ 0,
where G = w+T (1− y˜) = w+T (1− h/b) . At the corner solution, we have
that h/b > 1/2β, implying that (2βh/b) > 1. In the above condition, there is
thus two positive terms and one negative term, so that the optimal value of b is
given by:
C ′(b)
G
T
=
h
b2
[
1 + µ
G
T
(
2β
h
b
− 1
)]
Defining φ = hb2 −C ′(b)GT +µ hb2
(
2β hb − 1
)
G
T , we can sign the comparative-static
effects δb∗/δh and δb∗/δβ.
First note that φb < 0, by virtue of the second-order condition. We also
have that
φh =
1
b2
+ C ′(b)
1
b
+
µ
b2
G
T
(
2β
h
b
− 1
)
+ µ
h
b3
(
2β
G
T
− 1
)
This expression is unambiguously positive because 2βh/b is greater than one
because of (33), and 2βG/T is a fortiori greater than one because G/T must be
higher than y˜ = h/b. As a consequence, δb∗/δh = −φh/φb > 0. On the other
hand, δb∗/δβ = −φβ/φb > 0, because
φβ = 2µ
h2
b3
G
T
> 0
References
[1] Arndt, C., S. Jones, and F. Tarp, 2010. “Aid, Growth, and De-
velopment: Have We Come Full Circle?”, Journal of Globalization
and Development, Vol. 1, N° 2, pp. .
[2] Azam, J.P., and J.J. Laffont, 2000. “Contracting for Aid”, Journal
of Development Economics, Vol. 70, Nr.1, pp. 25-58.
[3] Bigsten, A., 2013, “International Coordination and the Effective-
ness of Aid”, Mimeo, University of Gothenburg.
40
[4] Bolton, P. and M. Dewatripont, 2005, Contract Theory, Cambridge
MA, and London: The MIT Press.
[5] Bourguignon, F., and J.P. Platteau, 2013, “Aid Effectiveness Re-
visited: The Trade-off between Needs and Governance”, Working
Paper, Paris School of Economics.
[6] Burnside, C. and D. Dollar, 2000. “Aid, Policies, and Growth”,
American Economic Review, Vol. 90, N° 4, pp. 847–868.
[7] Chauvet, L. P. Collier, and A. Fuster, 2012, “Supervision and
Project Performance: A Principal-Agent Approach”, Working Pa-
per, Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (DIAL), Paris.
[8] Chong, A., M. Gradstein, and C. Calderon, 2009. “Can Foreign Aid
Reduce Income Inequality and Poverty?”, Public Choice, Vol. 140,
pp. 59-84.
[9] Dalgaard, C.J., H. Hansen, and F. Tarp, 2004. “On the Empirics
of Foreign Aid and Growth”, Economic Journal, Vol. 114, N° 496,
pp. F191-216.
[10] DFID, 2011. Multilateral Aid Review, Taking Forward the Findings
of the UK Multilateral Aid Review, DFID, London.
[11] Dijkstra, G., 2013, “Governance or Poverty Reduction? Assessing
Budget Support in Nicaragua”, Journal of Development Studies,
Vol. 49, Nr.1, pp. 110-124.
[12] Djankov, S., J. Montalvo, and M. Reynal-Querol, 2008. “The Curse
of Aid”, Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 13, N° 3, pp. 169-194.
[13] Doucouliagos, H. and M. Paldam, 2009. “The Aid Effectiveness
Literature: The Sad Results of 40 Years of Research”, Journal of
Economic Surveys, Vol. 23, N° 3, pp. 433–461.
[14] Easterly, W., 2007. The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s
Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill And So Little Good.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[15] Fafchamps, M., 2004, 2004, Market Institutions in Sub-Saharan
Africa Theory and Evidence, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
[16] Garoupa, N. (1997), “The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement”,
Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol 11, Nr 3, pp 267-295.
[17] Gaspart, F., and J.P. Platteau, 2012, “The Perverse Effect of Cheap
Aid Money”, CRED Working Paper, Centre for Research in Eco-
nomic Development, University of Namur, Belgium.
41
[18] Juselius, K., N.F. Moller, and F. Tarp, 2013. “The Long-Run Im-
pact of Foreign Aid in 36 African Countries: Insights from Multi-
variate Time Series Analysis”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and
Statistics, published online (forthcoming in print).
[19] Kilby, C., 1995. “Supervision and Performance: The Case of World
Bank Projects”, Tilburg University, The Netherlands, and Vassar
College, USA.
[20] MacLeod, W.B., 2007, “Reputations, Relationships, and Contract
Enforcement”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLV, N° 3, pp.
595-628.
[21] Masud, N., and B. Yontcheva, 2005. “Does Foreign Aid Reduce
Poverty? Empirical Evidence from Nongovernmental and Bilateral
Aid”, IMF Working Paper 05/100, Washington DC: International
Monetary Fund.
[22] OECD, 2009. Sweden: Development Assistance Committee (DAC)
Peer Review, Paris.
[23] Oden, B., and L. Wohlgemuth, 2011, “Where is the Paris Agenda
Heading? Changing Relations in Tanzania, Zambia and Mozam-
bique”, ECPDM Briefing Note Nr. 21 (February).
[24] Otsuka, K., H. Chuma, and Y. Hayami, 1993, “Permanent Labour
and Land Tenancy Contracts in Agrarian Economies: An Inte-
grated Analysis”, Economica, Vol. 60, N° 237, pp. 57-77.
[25] Pritchett, L., M. Woolcock, and M. Andrews, 2013, “Looking Like
a State: Techniques of Persistent Failure in State Capability for
Implementation”, Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 49, Nr.1,
pp. 1-18.
[26] Rajan, R.G. and A. Subramanian, 2007. “Does Aid Affect Gover-
nance?”, American Economic Review, Vol. 97, N° 2, pp. 322–327.
[27] Rajan, R. G. and A. Subramanian, 2008. “Aid and Growth: What
Does the Cross-Country Evidence Really Show?”, The Review of
Economics and Statistics, Vol. 90, N° 4, pp. 643–665.
[28] Roodman, D., 2007. “The Anarchy of Numbers: Aid, Development,
and Cross-Country Empirics”, World Bank Economic Review, Vol.
21, N° 2, pp. 255-277.
[29] SADEV, 2010. Evaluation of Sweden’s Implementation of the Paris
Declaration, SADEV (Swedish Agency for Development) Report
2010: 6, Stockholm.
42
[30] Svensson, J., 2000, “When is Foreign Aid Policy Credible? Aid De-
pendence and Conditionality”, Journal of Development Economics,
Vol. 61, N° 1, pp. 61-84.
[31] Svensson, J., 2003, “Why Conditional Aid Does Not Work and
What Can Be Done About It ?”, Journal of Development Eco-
nomics, Vol. 70, N° , pp. 381-402.
[32] Wahhaj, Z., 2008. “A Brief Note on Participatory Development and
Elite Capture”. CRED (Centre for Research in Economic Develop-
ment), University of Namur, Mimeo.
43
